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ESSAY
ANALYZING THE ROLE OF NON-PRACTICING
ENTITIES IN THE PATENT SYSTEM
David L. Schwartz† & Jay P. Kesan††
Currently, there is an important debate about the role of non-practicing
entities in patent litigation.  People are asking: What are the costs and bene-
fits associated with NPE litigation?  Are they too high, too low, or just right?
This Essay makes two contributions to the discussion.  First, we review a
recent study, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, by James Bessen and
Michael J. Meurer.  The study presents new data on the litigation costs and
settlement expenses incurred by a subset of defendants in NPE cases.  Some of
their findings are provocative, but we find their methodology to be deficient
in several respects, which limits the usefulness of the data and thus the impli-
cations that can be drawn from them.  We also offer suggestions for future
research on NPEs, including data collection and analysis.  Second, we argue
that the study asks the wrong question.  The debate should be reframed to
focus on the merits of the lawsuits, including patent system changes focusing
on reducing transaction costs (e.g., lawyers’ fees) in patent litigation, instead
of focusing solely on whether the patent holder is a non-practicing entity.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426 R
I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND THE DEBATE ABOUT NPES . . . . . . 428 R
A. Perceived Flaws in the Survey and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 434 R
1. Estimate of Costs Is Likely Biased Too High . . . . . . . . . 434 R
2. Analysis of the Costs of NPE Litigation Lacks an
Adequate Baseline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438 R
3. Relies on a Questionable Definition of NPE . . . . . . . . . 440 R
4. Ignores Small Businesses Who Are Patentees . . . . . . . . . 441 R
B. Recommended Additional Disclosures About
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445 R
II. SUGGESTIONS FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NPES . . . . . . . . . . 448 R
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450 R
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455 R
† Associate Professor of Law, Co-Director of the Center for Empirical Studies of Intel-
lectual Property, Chicago–Kent College of Law.
†† Professor and H. Ross & Helen Workman Research Scholar, University of Illinois
College of Law.  We would like to thank Colleen Chien, John Golden, Robert Greenspoon,
Edward Lee, Adam Mossoff, Lee Petherbridge, Michael Risch, and Christopher Seaman for
their comments and suggestions on prior drafts of this Essay.
425
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-2\CRN204.txt unknown Seq: 2 10-JAN-14 11:56
426 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:425
INTRODUCTION
Currently, patent litigation is undergoing a seismic change.  In
the past, industry competitors lodged the bulk of patent-infringement
lawsuits.1  But recently, an increasing number of patent lawsuits have
been initiated by entities who do not manufacture products them-
selves, including universities, individual inventors, failed businesses,
and speculators who purchase patents from others.2  This heterogene-
ous group of patent holders has loosely been referred to as “non-prac-
ticing entities,” or “NPEs” for short, and some estimate that
approximately 60% of new patent lawsuits are filed by NPEs.3  Some
pejoratively refer to some or all NPEs as “patent trolls,” analogizing
that these patent holders wait until another brings a product to mar-
ket and then jump from under the bridge to demand a toll.4  Others
refer to some or all NPEs as “patent assertion entities,” or “PAEs.”5
The rise in NPE lawsuits has coincided with other changes in the
patent system.  For instance, patent litigators appear to be polarizing
into a plaintiffs’ bar and a defense bar.6  This polarization in lawyers is
new to patent litigation but has existed for many years in other areas
of the law, such as medical malpractice, products liability, and labor
law.7  In addition to the lawyers, certain industries have experienced
more infringement allegations by NPEs, an occurrence that has cre-
ated rifts in many debates about patent reform.8  In general, many
1 Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Golliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the
Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1603 (2009) (noting that over 80% of
patent lawsuits filed between 2000 and 2008 involving “high tech” patents were filed by
practicing entities).
2 See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 458 (2012).
3 Colleen Chien, Assistant Professor, Santa Clara Univ., Presentation to the DOJ/
FTC Hearing on Patent Assertion Entities: Patent Assertion Entities, at slide 23 (Dec. 10,
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314 (report-
ing that 61% of patent lawsuits filed from January 1 to December 1, 2012, were filed by
patent assertion entities). But see Christopher Anthony Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L.
Schwartz, Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) Under the Microscope: An Empirical Investigation of
Patent Holders as Litigants 16 fig.1 (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14-17, 2013), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2346381 (reporting lower numbers of suits brought by PAEs,
with the results varying based upon the definition of PAE used).
4 James Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of
Patent Trolls, REGULATION, Winter 2011–12, at 26, 26, available at http://www.cato.org/
sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2012/5/v34n4-1.pdf.
5 See Chien, supra note 3, at slide 4. R
6 David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of NPEs in the Patent System,
PATENTLY-O (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/08/analyzing-the-
role-of-npes-in-the-patent-system.html.
7 See, e.g., Lee A. Rosengard, Learning from Law Firms: Using Co-Mediation to Train New
Mediators, DISP. RESOL. J., May/July 2004, at 16, 16, 18 (noting that the medical-malpractice
industry has distinct plaintiff and defense bars).
8 Large manufacturing, computer and IT, and financial-services companies sought
damages reform in patent litigation purportedly due to the increase in costs caused by
patent assertions.  On the other hand, small and mid-size technology companies argue that
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large IT and electronics companies are frequent targets of NPEs,
while big pharmaceutical companies are rarely, if ever, approached by
NPEs.9  The topic of NPEs in patent litigation—their costs and bene-
fits—has featured prominently in the press, including extensive cover-
age of a study reporting that the “direct, accrued costs” of NPEs were
$29 billion in 2011.10
Commentators and patent practitioners have expressed varying
and diverse opinions about the impact of NPEs on the patent-litiga-
tion system.  Some claim that NPEs are antithetical to the Constitu-
tion’s mandate that the patent laws encourage innovation.11  They
argue that NPEs hinder rather than encourage innovation, especially
in the software field.12  Others claim that NPEs provide small inven-
tors and companies an opportunity otherwise missing to receive re-
wards for their inventions.13  How should we evaluate these competing
claims?
In this Essay, we explain how to approach this important ques-
tion.  We argue that a data-driven, objective approach to the issue is
critical.  Anecdotal evidence of abuses by NPEs or large operating
companies and the various theories on why NPEs may encourage or
frustrate innovation are useful, but they cannot resolve the debate.
We believe that data is critical to evaluating broad trends in patent
litigation and patent-related behavior.  Yet there is little hard data,
and much of the data that exists is mixed or inconclusive.  A much
more thorough empirical analysis of the issue is needed.
We also submit that the debate about NPE litigation should be
reframed.  We submit that the debate should focus on the merits of
the lawsuits or the actions of the parties in the litigation, or both, and
damages reform would (1) limit trial courts’ flexibility to craft appropriate remedies, (2)
make infringement cheaper, and (3) encourage litigation rather than payment of licensing
fees. See David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 127, 135–37 (2009).
9 See Ian Rainey, The War over Information Technology Patents: How Microsoft v. I4i Is
Reforming the Mobile Entertainment Industry, 11 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 137, 154 (2011)
(“As opposed to the pharmaceutical companies, information technology companies have
recently become increasingly concerned with infringement claims initiated by non-practic-
ing entities or patent trolls.”).
10 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 387, 389 (2014).
11 See John M. Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 2111, 2112 (2007).
12 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 392. R
13 See Jiaqing “Jack” Lu, The Economics and Controversies of Non-practicing Entities (NPEs):
How NPEs and Defensive Patent Aggregators Will Change the License Market, LES NOUVELLES,
Mar. 2012, at 55, 61, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1935
524 (discussing how entrepreneurs, universities, and research institutions who do not have
competency in marketing and licensing can alleviate the risks associated with patents by
selling their patents to NPEs, thereby freeing them to exploit “their comparative advan-
tages in innovating”).
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not on the parties’ identities.  We believe that focusing on the merits
is a more fruitful approach than focusing solely on whether the patent
holder is or is not an NPE.
This Essay proceeds in three parts.  In Part I, we set forth some
difficulties in empirically evaluating NPEs.  To illustrate the point, we
critically examine a recent high-profile study, which appears in this
same issue of the Cornell Law Review, that reported that the “direct,
accrued costs” of NPEs were $29 billion in 2011.14  In Part II, we offer
constructive suggestions on how to design a better empirical study of
NPEs.  Finally, in Part III, we offer suggestions on how to improve the
patent system if the empirical data shows that problematic behavior by
NPEs is widespread.
I
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND THE DEBATE ABOUT NPES
Whatever we call them, one question persists: why do NPEs exist?
Under one narrative, NPEs serve an important market need: acting as
an intermediary for some patentees.15  Trading to make money in the
market is as old as mankind.  Here, the cost of patent litigation—due
to the traditional hourly billing model—is prohibitively high for most
small to medium-sized patent holders.  NPEs purchase patents from
these patentees who cannot afford to enforce their own patents.  NPEs
accept the risks and uncertainty associated with attempting to enforce
the patent rights.  And NPEs expect and are entitled to make money
for assuming those risks and uncertainty.  Without the payment from
an NPE, the inventors would receive no compensation whatsoever for
their invention.
Another related development is contingent-fee representation for
patent enforcement.  Contingent-fee representation has recently be-
come more widely available but, according to theory, is primarily for a
select group of innovators with patent rights that are perceived as val-
uable before litigation commences.16  NPEs, together with
contingent-fee lawyers, create avenues for appropriating rewards for
valuable patent rights that are owned by entities with limited re-
sources, including universities.
There is, however, a counternarrative: that NPEs are opportunis-
tic players in the patent system and serve almost no useful purpose.17
14 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 389. R
15 See Ashish Arora, Patents, Licensing, and Market Structure in the Chemical Industry, 26
RES. POL’Y 391, 395–97 (1997).
16 See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64
ALA. L. REV. 335, 358 (2012) (explaining the “substantial due diligence” that lawyers state
that they perform before they agree to represent a client on a contingent-fee basis).
17 See Risch, supra note 2, at 459. R
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Under this narrative, NPEs assert marginal patents and read patent
claims unreasonably expansively.  Under any reasonable view, the pat-
ents are likely invalid or not infringed by the NPEs’ targets.  NPEs,
who themselves do not innovate or introduce any products into the
marketplace, merely extract rents from the large, innovative compa-
nies that they sue.  They create fear of holdup by selecting venues
where injunctive relief is available such as the International Trade
Commission.  They seek and accept “nuisance” settlement amounts,
far below the cost of litigation, so that the NPEs’ targets have no in-
centive to defend in costly litigation.18  And, worst of all, NPEs do not
materially help the original inventors of the patents.  They are not
returning any significant money to the inventors; instead, as in-
termediaries, the NPEs and their lawyers pocket almost all of the
revenues.
We believe that objective, empirical evidence is critical in the
study of NPEs.  While a consensus exists that data is critical, a huge
hurdle in the study of NPEs is that there is no uniformly accepted
definition of who is an NPE or patent troll.19  Obviously, before we
can meaningfully study or even discuss NPEs, it is important to define
precisely what is an NPE.
Some entities clearly fall within the definition of an NPE: for in-
stance, a shell company unrelated to the original inventors that
purchases a patent for the sole purpose of enforcement.  Additionally,
the large patent aggregators who purchase portfolios of patents from
inventors and others for the primary purpose of enforcement are
clearly NPEs, although perhaps of a different sort than small shell
companies.  The classification of other entities is less clear.  For in-
stance, while universities clearly are “non-practicing” in that they
rarely if ever commercialize products themselves, many leading schol-
ars do not consider universities to be trolls.20  University faculty and
graduate students are often true innovators and have core competen-
cies in sectors that are creative and innovation-centric.  However, their
profession—academic research—does not involve manufacturing,
marketing, and distribution capabilities.
18 Patrick Anderson, Do NPE’s “Cost” Us $29 B?  Intellectual Ventures Co-Founder Peter
Detkin Sets the Record Straight, GAMETIME IP (June 28, 2012), http://gametimeip.com/2012/
06/28/do-npes-cost-us-29-b-intellectual-ventures-co-founder-peter-detkin-sets-the-record-
straight/.
19 Golden, supra note 11, at 2112 n.7 (observing that “a widely accepted definition of R
a patent troll has yet to be devised”).
20 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 612 (2008) (arguing that universities should not be deemed trolls);
Risch, supra note 2, at 468. R
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Similarly, many do not view individual inventors as patent trolls,
although they are technically non-practicing.21  While admittedly an-
ecdotal, individual inventors frequently complain that most large com-
panies ignore requests to license their patents even when infringing.22
If university and individual patentees are to receive compensation for
their patented inventions, then their licensees or proven infringers
must sell products or services embodying their patents.23  In the ab-
sence of such market adoption, there is rarely if ever a reward to be
had.24  Such innovators do not typically have the access to the capital
that is necessary to bring their inventions to market.  They also do not
have the existing channels of manufacturing, marketing, and distribu-
tion.  As a result, their options are quite limited in trying to receive
any compensation for their patented technologies.  We recognize that
researchers and policymakers disagree on whether individual inven-
tors and universities are PAEs, NPEs, and/or trolls.  Individual inven-
tors enforcing their own patents make up a fair percentage of non-
operating-company patent lawsuits.  According to data we have re-
cently gathered, approximately 20%–30% of 2010 non-operating-com-
pany patent lawsuits were filed by individuals or enforcement
companies formed by the individual inventor.25
We question whether such individual inventors should be in-
cluded within the definition of NPE.  Some argue that NPEs are bad
on the ground that they function as middleman between the original
inventor and the infringer.26  The argument is that the NPE extracts
too high a price for its service and that the original inventors do not
receive sufficient compensation to justify the additional liability on the
21 See Risch, supra note 2, at 468 (noting that nonlitigious NPEs, such as individual R
inventors, “are not the object of scorn that litigious entities are”).
22 This is an age-old complaint by individual inventors who are NPEs.  In the early
1850s, for instance, Elias Howe’s repeated requests for I.M. Singer & Co. to pay a license
fee for its (unauthorized) use of Howe’s patented lockstitch were rejected, resulting in
Howe (an NPE) suing Singer for infringement. See Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the
First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165,
183–85 (2011).
23 See generally Lemley, supra note 20, at 618 (recognizing patent licensing and litiga- R
tion as important revenue sources for universities).  We recognize that in rare circum-
stances these patentees can receive compensation without sales.  For instance, they may
receive an up-front, lump-sum licensing fee, or they could sell their patent rights to a prac-
ticing entity that does not end up practicing the particular patented invention.
24 A number of people have discussed the peculiar problems that various types of
non-practicing entities or small firms might face in appropriating value from their inven-
tions. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 545
(2010) (“For small firms or independent inventors, . . . patent rights might be the only
effective means to obtain a return on investments in research and development.”).
25 Cotropia, Kesan & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 16 fig.1. R
26 See Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive
Aggregators, and Super-Aggregators, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 53 (2013) (discussing how NPEs
can cause economic harm by acting as intermediaries).
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operating company.27  To the extent that NPEs are viewed as bad for
this reason (which may be the case in some shell holding companies),
this is rarely if ever the case when individuals enforce their own pat-
ents.  Individual patent owners enforcing their own patents typically
receive the vast majority of any licensing revenue.28
Another, newer business form is the patent-privateering model.29
Privateering is the practice of an operating company assigning its pat-
ents to a shell company.30  The shell company monetizes the patents
and returns a percentage of the downstream collections to the operat-
ing company.31  While the shell company is technically an NPE, the
patents were invented and prosecuted by operating companies.  These
hybrid relationships seem quite different from individual inventors
and even from large patent aggregators, which often buy patents and
have no ongoing relationship with the original inventors.
To exemplify the difficulties of empirically evaluating NPEs, we
now turn to a recent, highly influential study.  Two Boston University
researchers, James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, published a study
called “The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes” in this issue of the Cornell
Law Review.32  Their study purports to assess the direct costs of patent
assertions by non-practicing entities.33  Bessen and Meurer’s study re-
lies on two proprietary data sources compiled by RPX Corporation:
(1) results of a survey of certain NPE defendants and (2) a database of
NPE lawsuits from 2005 through 2011.34  The study finds that the di-
rect costs of NPE patent assertions are “substantial, totaling about $29
billion accrued in 2011.”35  One-quarter of these costs are litigation
27 See id. at 61–62 (discussing how superaggregator NPEs impose a high price on op-
erating companies while paying lower compensation).
28 Bessen and Meurer contend that no one disputes that “NPEs have a bargaining
advantage over practicing-entity patent plaintiffs because NPEs are invulnerable to patent
counterclaims and have lower litigation costs, especially discovery costs.”  Bessen & Meurer,
supra note 10, at 413.  We agree with the latter half of their claim regarding counterclaims R
and discovery costs.  However, one should not lose sight of the fact that practicing-entity
patent plaintiffs have several additional avenues of settlement available that NPEs do not.
For instance, cross licenses or outside business relationships may constitute part of the
settlement of a competitor lawsuit, while NPEs only are interested in money.  This limits
the options of NPEs in settling cases relative to practicing entities.  We believe that this
complicates the analysis of which type of entity has a “bargaining advantage.”
29 See Tom Ewing, Introducing the Patent Privateers, 45 INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Jan./Feb.
2011, at 31, 32–33.
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10.  When Bessen and Meurer first released their R
study in the summer of 2012, we posted an earlier draft of this Essay.  All of us—Bessen,
Meurer, Schwartz, and Kesan—have worked back and forth with the Editors of the Cornell
Law Review to revise our articles to respond to each other’s points.
33 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 389. R
34 Id. at 394–95.
35 Id. at 422.
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costs—primarily legal fees for accused infringers.36  The study argues
that this ratio “implies that a substantial part of the direct costs of NPE
litigation is a deadweight loss to society.”37  It also claims that “NPE
patent assertions hinder innovation by hurting small inventors.”38  Fi-
nally, Bessen and Meurer find that “it seems difficult to make a con-
vincing argument that the effect of NPEs is to increase innovation
incentives.”39  The study’s conclusions, especially the $29 billion fig-
ure, have been reported widely in the press, including coverage by
CNN, Bloomberg, Reuters, the BBC, The Atlantic, The Huffington Post,
CNET, and numerous blogs.40
To be clear, we acknowledge that Bessen and Meurer’s study pro-
vides interesting new data.  Public data on litigation costs and settle-
ments in patent litigation is scarce.  The vast majority of patent cases
settle, and most settlement agreements include a confidentiality provi-
sion prohibiting the parties from publicly disclosing its terms.41  Fur-
thermore, companies rarely publicly disclose the amount paid to
outside lawyers in attorneys’ fees.  The study provides new information
about costs and settlements that was not previously available, and for
that we commend them.  In addition, they provide data on the previ-
ously unexplored topic of NPE assertions that did not result in litiga-
tion.  This is also an interesting issue.  As described in more detail
36 Id. at 400.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 411.
39 Id.
40 See, e.g., Susan Decker, Business Costs Quadruple on Patent-Owner Claims: BGOV Barom-
eter, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-
26/business-costs-quadruple-on-patent-owner-claims-bgov-barometer.html; David
Goldman, Patent Trolls Cost Inventors Half a Trillion Dollars, CNN MONEY (Sept. 21, 2011,
5:19 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/21/technology/patent_troll_cost/index.htm;
Dara Kerr, Patent Trolls Curb Innovation and Cost the U.S. $29B in 2011, CNET (June 26,
2012, 5:41 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57461110-93/patent-trolls-curb-inno
vation-and-cost-the-u.s-$29b-in-2011/; ‘Patent trolls’ Cost Other US Bodies $29bn Last Year, Says
Study, BBC NEWS (June 29, 2012, 4:36 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
18598559; Rebecca J. Rosen, Study: Patent Trolls Cost Companies $29 Billion Last Year, ATLAN-
TIC (June 29, 2012, 7:37 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/06/
study-patent-trolls-cost-companies-29-billion-last-year/259070/.  A few blogs have criticized
the study. See A $29 Billion US Troll-Tax or Just Another Statistical Smokescreen?, PATENTOLOGY
BLOG (June 29, 2012), http://blog.patentology.com.au/2012/06/29-billion-us-troll-tax-or-
just-another.html; Anderson, supra note 18.  In addition, IAM Magazine’s blog subtly im- R
plies that the large amount of press that the study generated is due to the push of several
major corporations, presumably ones that favor the policy changes recommended in the
study.  Joff Wild, The PR Genius of Messrs Bessen and Meurer, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. BLOG
(June 28, 2012), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=e780ve3b8-715d-484f-
9318-d04d81e0e9d8.
41 See John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants,
99 GEO. L.J. 677, 709 (2011) (asserting that in the context of software and NPE patents,
settlements are confidential); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Re-
solved?  An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH.
U. L. REV. 237, 259 (2006) (noting that “approximately 80% of patent cases settle”).
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below, some of their results are provocative and deserve further scru-
tiny, while others are questionable.  However, as academics interested
in patent law, patent policy, and empirical methodology, there are a
number of limitations in Bessen and Meurer’s methodology that we
recommend they or others address.  In our opinion, these limitations
require that Bessen and Meurer’s findings on the issue of NPEs be
viewed with some reservations and skepticism.
Our views can be summarized as:
(1) Figures Based on Biased Sample. Bessen and Meurer’s $29 bil-
lion calculation of the direct cost of NPE patent assertions
should be viewed as the highest possible limit—the true num-
ber is very likely to be substantially lower.  It is the outer bound
because the survey is not a random or representative sample;
instead, it likely is a biased sample, which renders Bessen and
Meurer’s extrapolation of the total costs similarly biased too
high.
(2) Lack of Basis for Comparison of Figures. The vast majority of
the $29 billion figure consists of settlement, licensing, and judg-
ment amounts.42  For economists, these are not “costs,” as they
are classified in Bessen and Meurer’s study, but rather “trans-
fers.”43  Such transfers to patent holders are the contemplated
rewards of the patent system.  Furthermore, before declaring lit-
igation costs (i.e., lawyers’ fees) too high, there must be some
basis for comparison.  Bessen and Meurer provide no such com-
parison.  For further academic studies, we propose comparing
them either to the ratio of lawyers’ fees to settlements in practic-
ing-entity patent litigation or to complex commercial litigation
more broadly.
(3) Questionable Definition of NPE. Bessen and Meurer’s calcula-
tions rest upon a questionable and very broad definition of
NPE.  We suggest that they disaggregate among different cate-
gories of NPE, which should be possible with RPX’s database.
(4) Lack of Credible Information on Benefits of NPEs. Bessen and
Meurer’s estimate of the benefits of NPE litigation is based on
an analysis of very limited information, namely SEC filings from
10 publicly traded NPEs.44  We recommend a survey of NPE
plaintiffs analogous to the survey of NPE defendants in order to
provide more complete information on this issue.
42 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 405–06. R
43 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 8–9 (8th ed. 2011).
44 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 403. R
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A. Perceived Flaws in the Survey and Analysis
1. Estimate of Costs Is Likely Biased Too High
First, we believe that Bessen and Meurer’s estimate is likely biased
to be very high.  Their estimate is based on a relatively small survey,
which was extrapolated to the larger population of NPE lawsuits.45
We find flaws with both the survey and the subsequent extrapolation.
With respect to the survey, it is not a random sample of NPEs.
Without a simple random or stratified sample or other evidence that
the sample is representative, it is improper to impute the results of the
sample to the larger population.  According to Bessen and Meurer,
RPX sent the survey to “about 250 companies,” which include “RPX
clients and nonclient companies with whom RPX has relationships.”
This vague description of survey recipients is difficult to evaluate.  We
recognize that confidentiality concerns may limit the amount of dis-
closure that can be provided about the sample.  Still, we recommend
that Bessen and Meurer release substantially more information about
the surveyed population, which need not include the identity of the
subjects but which can permit examination for whether it appears rep-
resentative.  Information about the frequency at which the subjects
were defendants in patent litigation, some information about the legal
counsel engaged by defendants in these suits (i.e., American Lawyer
100 firms or less expensive, smaller firms), a more detailed breakdown
of the subjects’ industries, a more detailed breakdown of the subjects’
revenues, and how many of the subjects were RPX clients would be
helpful.
Without this information, we are left to make several assumptions
about the pool of survey recipients, which we feel are reasonable and
which lead us to the conclusion that there is a strong selection bias.
RPX calls itself a defensive patent aggregator.46  A large portion of
RPX’s business model is providing subscriptions to customers who are
repeat defendants in patent-infringement lawsuits.47  RPX asserts that
its subscription fees “are significantly lower than the typical patent ac-
quisition (and defense) costs a client would otherwise face.”48  It
seems extremely likely that RPX’s clients have experienced high litiga-
tion costs, perhaps much higher than the average company.  As such,
the survey has a strong selection bias in favor of companies that are
45 See id. at 394 (noting the sample size); id. at 422 (concluding that “[t]he direct costs
of NPE patent assertions are substantial, totaling about $29 billion accrued in 2011”).
46 See Catherine White, Taking on the Trolls, INTELL. PROP. MAG., Oct. 2012, at 98, 98,
available at http://www.rpxcorp.com/siteFiles/News/ABAFDBBC110C77BC90FE5F0BEFD
EEDE9.pdf (noting that “RPX states it offers defensive patent aggregation”).
47 See id. at 98–99 (describing how RPX generates funds).
48 See Nexsen Pruet & Dan Leonardi, Avoiding Confrontations with Licensing Firms, LEX-
OLOGY (July 18, 2011), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=03dbc3de-fb58-4c
b9-ba39-6b0d1affa8d5.
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repeat defendants in NPE litigation and thus need the services of RPX
to reduce future patent liabilities.  In other words, high litigation costs
are probably the reason the companies became RPX clients in the first
instance.  The other subjects who received the survey are identified
only as “nonclient companies with whom RPX has relationships.”49
Without more information, we can only assume that these are poten-
tial customers of RPX.  Again, these likely are companies with higher
litigation costs and liability exposure compared to the average com-
pany.50  They may also be more risk averse and settle for higher
amounts than the average company.  Thus, without further informa-
tion, the companies to whom the survey was sent are likely biased, with
these companies having much higher than average litigation costs.
We further suspect that the subset of companies that actually re-
sponded to the survey is even more biased.  According to Bessen and
Meurer, 82 companies completed the survey, a response rate of ap-
proximately one-third.51  Bessen and Meurer provide no descriptive
information about how these 82 companies compare to the approxi-
mately 250 companies to whom the survey was sent.  We believe such
information should be disclosed.  Without more information, a rea-
sonable assumption is that the responding companies likely had easier
access to the information (i.e., better electronic recordkeeping),
which likely means larger companies or companies that were more
motivated to respond (i.e., they have higher exposure and costs), or
both.  Thus, it is very likely that there were selection effects on multi-
ple levels: the solicited companies had higher costs and expenses than
the average company, and the responding companies had higher
costs and transfers than the universe of companies solicited.  Our view
is supported by Bessen and Meurer’s disclosure that 72% of the 82
respondents are publicly traded companies, while only 14% of all NPE
defendants are.52  Public companies are much more likely to engage
higher-priced lawyers and have higher litigation costs and expenses.
49 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 394. R
50 Bessen and Meurer respond that we are conflating “litigation frequency with cost
per defense.” Id. at 416.  They speculate that frequent defendants may be more efficient at
defending because they have the relevant documents handy, have trained personnel to
handle depositions, etc., and thus have lower costs than average. See id. We don’t know
whether their speculation is correct as we do not have access to the underlying data, but we
have our doubts.  The largest NPE defendants (a group that includes most of the large IT
companies) typically hire lawyers from the largest law firms having the highest hourly bill-
ing rates, and many of these firms are not known for lean staffing on matters.  While some
defendants must be more efficient, we suspect that this is not frequent.  We informally
polled several experienced patent litigators, all of whom expressed skepticism about the
correctness of Bessen and Meurer’s hypothesis that RPX clients are more efficient liti-
gators.  But at this point, without more data, we cannot rule it out.  We suggest that Bessen
and Meurer release more data about the sample to illuminate this question.
51 Id. at 395.
52 See id. at 410 tbl.5.
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If Bessen and Meurer’s sample was biased, then their estimate of
the costs for the population of NPE defendants must be biased as well.
In fact, their estimate of the population magnifies the bias from the
small sample.53  Extrapolating from a sample to the full population is
only sound if it is a representative sample, preferably randomly gener-
ated.  Furthermore, the sample size of respondents (82 for litigated
cases and a mere 46 for nonlitigated cases) is very small.54  Bessen and
Meurer do seem to take into account the differences between large
and small firms.55  However, their method of extrapolation does not
take into account differences among large firms and among small
firms.  If their sample consists of large firms that have higher litigation
costs than the average large firm and small firms that have higher liti-
gation costs than the average small firm (using their definitions), then
their extrapolation still leads to a biased result.  Thus, we remain un-
convinced that their results are not biased too high.  In sum, at best,
Bessen and Meurer’s estimates of costs and transfers can be under-
stood as the highest possible bound.  In other words, the actual costs
and transfers from NPE litigation cannot be higher than their figure
and are very likely to be significantly lower.
Bessen and Meurer acknowledge that their sample is not random
but contend that there is evidence that it is representative.56  This con-
tention is based on benchmarking of their survey to other estimates of
litigation costs.57  Their benchmarking analysis is incorrect, in our
view, because it is based on inaccurate assumptions about patent litiga-
tion.  Bessen and Meurer claim that their sample is comparable to
litigation estimates of costs through the completion of discovery pub-
lished by the American Intellectual Property Law Association
53 Even if the sample was unbiased, researchers normally make clear that their esti-
mates of the larger population include uncertainty.  This is typically accomplished through
reporting the confidence interval.  Here, with a relatively small sample (82 respondents),
the range of potential values of the population would likely be large.  Bessen and Meurer,
however, report an exact number: $29 billion. Id. at 389.
54 See id. at 395.
55 See id. at 402 n.72.  Bessen and Meurer define a large firm as one with greater than
a billion dollars in annual revenue. Id. at 398.
56 See id. at 401–04 (“[T]he survey sample was not randomly selected and hence could
be unrepresentative. . . .  We can check the representativeness of our sample by comparing
our findings to other empirical evidence. . . .  The close similarity of these means suggests
that sample-selection issues do not substantially bias the survey findings.”).
57 In the original draft of Bessen and Meurer’s study, they attempted to benchmark to
two outside studies. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE
Disputes 13–15 (June 28, 2012) (unpublished manuscrupt) [hereinafter Bessen & Meurer,
Draft], available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/docu-
ments/BessenJ_MeurerM062512rev062812.pdf.  In the final version, they benchmarked to
three outside studies. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 401–04.  We commend them R
for taking serious efforts to benchmark since showing that their sample is representative is
critical for making any inferences about the population.
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(AIPLA).58  They benchmark to a second survey of lawsuits from 1985
to 2004 in which a patent owner was required to pay the defendant’s
legal fees.59  They then make adjustments to both cost estimates based
on the average number of papers filed with the court in cases that end
in summary judgment and cases that do not.60  As we pointed out in a
previous draft of this Essay, most cases settle much, much earlier than
summary judgment.61  With respect to the adjustment that Bessen and
Meurer made, we question whether it is sound.  Their adjustment im-
plicitly assumes that all papers filed with the court are of roughly the
same value.  In fact, many of the documents filed with the court in the
early stages of litigation are routine, inexpensive filings such as notices
of appearance and pro hac vice admissions.62  By assuming that these
early filings are roughly equivalent to filings later in the case (which
are more likely to be expensive, dispositive motions), we suspect that
Bessen and Meurer’s adjustments overstate the average cost of litiga-
tion.  Furthermore, NPE cases are often filed in speedy venues and
likely are resolved even faster, and thus cheaper, than the median
from other studies.63  Finally, Bessen and Meurer benchmark the set-
tlement amounts from their sample to the licensing revenues of 10
publicly traded NPEs and find that they are “broadly similar.”64  We
think that if Bessen and Meurer’s sample is “broadly similar” (however
that is defined) to litigation involving publicly traded NPEs, then that
is further evidence that their sample is biased too high.  We base this
on an assumption that publicly traded NPEs seek much more than the
average NPE in terms of settlement or licensing fees, an assumption
we believe is likely correct.  Thus, the benchmarking does not support
58 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 401–04. R
59 See id. at 402.
60 See id.
61 David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Essay: Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Enti-
ties in the Patent System 7 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors); see also Kesan
& Ball, supra note 41, at 246 (noting that “the vast majority of cases settle” and that “a R
much higher proportion of final rulings of invalidity occur at the pre-trial stage”).
62 For example, in DNT, LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., Civil Action 3:09-cv-00021 (E.D.
Va.), more than half of the first 75 docket entries in the case were for inexpensive filings
such as appearances and motion for admission pro hac vice. The docket entries near the
close of the case were substantive (and likely expensive) briefing on key issues in patent
litigation.
63 See QUINN EMANUEL TRIAL LAWYERS, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP,
BEST PRACTICES FOR DEFENDING AGAINST PATENT TROLLS (2011), available at http://www
.jdsupra.com/documents/60ca1e29-8ea5-4db6-ae4b-b5a562b38fc0.pdf (noting that NPEs
tend to prefer courts with historically speedy trial times due to the value of speed to NPEs).
RPX also may have assembled its own data on current cases, especially for those involving
NPEs.  We suggest that such data be made available.
64 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 403. R
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Bessen and Meurer’s contention that their data is representative.  It
actually shows the exact opposite: that the data is biased too high.65
2. Analysis of the Costs of NPE Litigation Lacks an Adequate
Baseline
Second, Bessen and Meurer state that the costs of NPE litigation
to defendants are “substantial,” as measured two different ways.66
They first assert that the direct costs (the sum of legal costs and settle-
ment or judgment costs) are “substantial” because they total $29 bil-
lion.67  They also assert that the legal costs are 23% of the total and
licensing costs are 77%.68  Bessen and Meurer assert that this ratio “im-
plies that a substantial part of the direct costs of NPE litigation is a
deadweight loss to society.”69  Even assuming that Bessen and
Meurer’s estimates on the population were accurate, we question both
of their inferences.
Turning first to the $29 billion “cost” figure, we disagree with
their terminology.  By Bessen and Meurer’s own estimate, roughly
three-quarters of the direct costs are verdicts, licensing fees, or other
settlement amounts.70  According to standardized economic terminol-
ogy, these figures are “transfers” contemplated by the patent system,
not “costs.”71  In other words, this is the money paid to a patent owner
in exchange for the disclosure and expense required to obtain a pat-
ent.  The transaction has resulted in money moving from one entity to
another in exchange for intellectual property rights, and economists
do not consider these costs.  Only if the NPEs’ patent lawsuits are mer-
65 There is another reason that the 2011 AIPLA cost study that Bessen and Meurer
use to benchmark is inapplicable.  The 2011 AIPLA study is based upon responses from
2010, which likely reported data from 2009.  This may make the cost estimates too low.
However, the 2009 responses presumably are from competitor patent litigation, not NPE
litigation.  Competitor litigation is more document intensive and is frequently litigated
more heavily by both parties (e.g., due to the injunction risk).  Bessen and Muerer appar-
ently agree with these observations but still take the position that NPE-litigation costs may
be higher than average litigation costs because “the stakes tend to be higher and holdup
problems are especially severe.”  Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 401–02 n.70.  But the R
2013 AIPLA cost survey provides evidence that contradicts Bessen and Meurer’s claim. See
AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2013 (2013).  For
the first time in 2013, the AIPLA cost survey separates the cost of defending NPE cases
from the costs of all patent litigation.  Not surprisingly (to us), the average cost of defend-
ing NPE cases is substantially less than the average cost of litigating a patent case.  Thus, on
balance, the 2011 AIPLA study costs should be higher than Bessen and Meurer’s data.  The
fact that they are in line further supports the view that Bessen and Meurer’s data is biased
too high.
66 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 422. R
67 Id.
68 Id. at 400 n.62.
69 Id. at 400.
70 See id. (explaining that legal costs are about a third as large as settlement costs and
one quarter of total litigation costs).
71 See POSNER, supra note 43, at 8–9. R
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itless and these transfers have no relation to the value of the asserted
patents are Bessen and Meurer correct that the full amount should be
viewed as a cost.72  Bessen and Meurer report that the median settle-
ment amount from their sample is $1.38 million and the median of
litigation costs is $560,000.73  RPX reports on its website slightly differ-
ent information: “in the majority of NPE assertions almost half the
cost to operating companies is legal cost.”74  Those numbers are pro-
vocative, as is Bessen and Meurer’s data on the skewed distribution of
legal costs, and they deserve further scrutiny.  But we do not believe
that on their face they prove that all or most patent lawsuits brought
by NPEs are meritless.  It could be that these are legitimate cases of
infringement without sky-high damages.
That leaves the 23% of direct costs that Bessen and Meurer re-
port as legal costs, an amount that Bessen and Meurer deem “substan-
tial.”75  Bessen and Meurer are correct that attorneys’ fees and other
litigation costs to the accused infringer are properly considered
“costs” by economists.76  The costs to the accused infringers are dol-
lars that economists would consider to be in the “bad” ledger.  The
litigation costs to the patentees and to the courts, which Bessen and
Meurer did not measure, would also be placed on this bad ledger.
We believe, however, that for completeness, these costs must be
balanced with the policy goals and benefits of NPE litigation.  Without
this balancing, the necessary implication of Bessen and Meurer’s as-
sertion is that all litigation is wasteful and should be abolished.  Take
for instance the criminal justice system.  It costs money for accused
wrongdoers to hire legal counsel.  But that doesn’t mean that we
should abolish the entire system.  Rather, the costs are balanced
against the public policy of punishing wrongdoers, deterring others
from committing crimes, etc.  Turning back to patent law, the policy
interests that need to be considered include promoting innovation,
rewarding inventors, and deterring infringement.77
72 Bessen and Meurer argue that costs and transfers equally affect operating compa-
nies. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 418 (“Innovation is equally discouraged by the R
payment of legal costs and the payment of transfers.”).  We agree that from a bottom-line
perspective, money out the door is money out the door.  However, that completely ignores
that the purposes of the patent laws include encouraging and rewarding innovation.  Pay-
ments made by infringers to owners of valid patents must occur for the patent system to
work.  While not all payments fit into this category, we believe that it is improper to cate-
gorically include all payments as costs.
73 See id. at 399 tbl.2.
74 Prying Open the “Black Box” of NPE Costs, RPX BLOG (June 26, 2012), http://www
.rpxcorp.com/index.cfm?pageID=169&itemID=24.
75 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 400 & n.62. R
76 See id. at 417–18 (discussing legal fees and other operating costs); see also POSNER,
supra note 43, at 8–9 (discussing differences between costs and transfers). R
77 In theory, enforcement of patents, including by NPEs, may also lead to other posi-
tive externalities such as encouraging potential infringers to develop searching or licensing
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A different way to consider the legal-cost issue is to pose the ques-
tion: what should we compare the costs to?  As empirical scholars, we
need to evaluate whether the $6.7 billion (23% of $29 billion) is statis-
tically different from some other number.  It is unrealistic to assume
that the costs should be zero.  No one is surprised that lawyers charge
a lot of money to represent accused infringers who are large corpora-
tions.  We believe that the legal costs should be compared to the costs
of patent litigation between practicing entities.  More precisely, the
question is: How does the ratio of legal fees to recoveries in NPE law-
suits compare to the ratio in competitor lawsuits?  We recommend fur-
ther research into the ratio for competitor or practicing-entity
litigation to make such a comparison.  We also suggest a comparison
to complex commercial litigation.  We submit that, without a baseline,
one cannot evaluate whether the legal costs in NPE cases are too high,
too low, or just right.
3. Relies on a Questionable Definition of NPE
In addition, Bessen and Meurer use an expansive definition of
non-practicing entity, beyond even those used by most critics of NPEs.
Bessen and Meurer equate NPE and patent troll78 and define them as:
patent assertion entities, individual inventors, universities, and non-
competing entities (operating companies asserting patents well
outside the area in which they make products and compete).79
Bessen and Meurer include patent owners who manufacture products
(i.e., practicing entities) within their definition of non-practicing enti-
ties—if the patents are “well outside the area in which they make
products.”80  We take no position on the objectively correct definition
of non-practicing entity but merely note that including practicing en-
tities within the definition of non-practicing entities is very difficult to
justify.
In our opinion, the definition used by Bessen and Meurer is
somewhat unconventional, and the breadth of their definition par-
tially drives their results.  Bessen and Meurer’s calculation assumes
that every time a small inventor licenses a patent to a practicing com-
pany, it results in a “deadweight loss,” regardless of the merits of the
infringement claim.81  We note that innovators who do not manufac-
ture products or offer services that embody their patented technolo-
practices or to help bring about more and more efficient compliance with others’ patent
rights generally.
78 Bessen and Meurer expressly state that NPEs and trolls are the same. See Bessen &
Meurer, supra note 10, at 387 (“‘[N]on-practicing entities’ (NPEs), popularly known as R
‘patent trolls’ . . . .”).
79 Id. at 395.
80 Id.
81 See id. at 400.
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gies (which are included within Bessen and Meurer’s definition of
NPE) are not parties to be simply tossed aside as socially unproductive
actors.
We believe that Bessen and Meurer’s results would be more
meaningful if they were disaggregated among the different categories,
which should be possible with RPX’s database.  For instance, one may
be interested in the direct costs and transfers caused by shell
patent-holding companies who are unrelated to the original patent
owner.  Alternatively, one could study the costs and transfers using a
definition of NPE that is broader but that excludes universities.82  We
believe that these disaggregated estimates would provide a clearer pic-
ture.  Obviously, narrowing the definition of non-practicing entity
would lower Bessen and Meurer’s $29 billion figure.  While it appears
that universities comprise only a small proportion of patent holders in
litigation, individual inventors make up a larger share.  From our data,
approximately 20%–30% of 2010 non-operating-company patent law-
suits were filed by individuals or an enforcement entity formed by the
individual inventor.83  Others have estimated that over 50% of all NPE
suits are brought by companies owned or controlled by the original
inventors.84  If these were excluded, by how much would Bessen and
Meurer’s estimate decrease?  Bessen and Meurer respond to our con-
cerns about their definition by saying that these definitional issues are
likely to have “only a small impact” on their results.85  We cannot un-
derstand how removing 50% or more from the data would not reduce
their cost projection or materially affect the results.  Unfortunately,
without more information, we have no ability to determine the size of
this reduction.  And notwithstanding Bessen and Meurer’s doubt of its
significance, more finely grained data will permit other researchers
greater resources for additional analyses.
4. Ignores Small Businesses Who Are Patentees
Finally, Bessen and Meurer argue that “much of this burden” of
NPE litigation “falls on small and medium-sized companies.”86  They
assert that small and medium-sized companies “accrue larger costs rel-
82 Others studying patent litigation have disaggregated universities, among other
types of NPEs. See John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top?  The Characteristics of
the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24 & n.43 (2009) (citing Lemley, supra note
20, at 612). R
83 See Cotropia, Kesan & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 16 fig.1. R
84 Raymond P. Niro, Why Bash Individual Inventor-Owned or Controlled Companies?,
IPWATCHDOG (June 30, 2013, 10:24 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/06/30/why-
bash-individual-inventor-owned-or-controlled-companies/id=42613/.
85 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 396 (arguing that the broader definition of R
NPEs does little to distort their conclusion).
86 Id. at 389.
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ative to their size.”87  From this data, they make the leap that NPE
litigation is bad for small businesses.  We concur that NPE litigation—
all litigation in fact—is usually undesirable for small-business defend-
ants.  But what about small-business patent-owner plaintiffs?  The pat-
ent system is one of the few tools that small businesses have available
to compete against larger, more established players in the market.
When Bessen and Meurer refer to small and medium-sized compa-
nies, they mean only the accused infringers.  Patent owners with valid
and infringed patents must be considered within this category as well.
Bessen and Meurer also contend that NPEs do not increase inno-
vation incentives.88  To measure returns to patent holders, Bessen and
Meurer look at revenues89 and expenditures from “10 publicly listed
firms that were predominantly in the patent-assertion business during
the period from 2005 to 2010.”90  They claim that these companies
filed lawsuits against 1,450 companies from 2005 until 2010, amount-
ing to about one-sixth of all PAE lawsuits.91  Bessen and Meurer find
that payments to individual inventors come to only 7% of NPE licens-
ing revenues and that less than one-quarter of these NPEs’ revenues
flow to innovative activity, which Bessen and Meurer define as
purchases of other patents or direct R&D expenses.92  Before address-
ing Bessen and Meurer’s argument, we note that financial data about
NPEs themselves is extremely difficult to obtain.  Nearly all NPEs are
private companies, and private companies rarely disclose internal cor-
porate details.  If the concern is that settlement dollars transferred to
NPEs are not provided to R&D or inventors, we suggest that these
private NPEs be surveyed, preferably on a random basis.  Similar to
the RPX survey of NPE defendants, a survey of NPEs on issues such as
litigation costs, settlements, transfers to inventors, and other issues
could be of tremendous value.  A survey of NPEs has the additional
advantage of exploring both sides of the issue.  It could reveal a more
complete and balanced picture of patent litigation than one can ob-
tain from surveying only one side, the accused infringers.
87 Id. at 411.
88 See id.
89 We are not accountants, but we suspect that many settlements include payouts over
time involving installment payments, which Bessen and Meurer’s method may not count
properly.
90 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 403.  In the original draft of their article, Bessen R
and Meurer indicated that they used 12 publicly traded NPEs for the analysis. See Bessen &
Meurer, Draft, supra note 57, at 20–21.  In their event study, they used 14 publicly traded R
NPEs for the analysis.  See Bessen et al., supra note 4, at 32 tbl.4.  The final version of their R
current essay apparently uses data from 10 publicly traded NPEs, although footnote 99
only identifies the precise year ranges for 9 companies.  See Bessen & Meurer, supra note
10, at 410 n.99. R
91 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 403. R
92 See id. at 411.
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Currently, publicly traded NPEs, which Bessen and Meurer relied
entirely upon, may provide the only publicly available data.  We sus-
pect that the publicly traded NPEs are different from the run-of-the-
mill NPEs.  For instance, these publicly traded NPEs may be more
likely to sue larger defendants.  We also suspect that publicly traded
NPEs are less likely to engage in nuisance suit–type litigation.
To evaluate Bessen and Meurer’s claims about publicly traded
NPEs, we asked them for their raw data.  After receiving no response,
we recreated the data ourselves from the underlying 10-Ks.  After re-
viewing the data, it appears that three of these companies drive almost
all of their results: InterDigital, Tessera, and Rambus account for over
75% of the licensing revenues from 2005 until 2010.93  We believe that
these three companies have filed less than 100 lawsuits in total during
that time period.  These 100 lawsuits represent less than a half of one
percent of the NPE lawsuits filed in the time period, far below the
one-sixth of cases that Bessen and Meurer report.  With such a tiny
sample, we urge caution before extrapolating results from effectively
three companies to the thousands of non–publicly traded NPEs.
Thus, we have significant concerns about whether Bessen and
Meurer’s findings, which essentially are from three companies, reflect
the activities of the average NPE.  Even putting aside the small sample
size issue, we have additional concerns because of the identity of these
three companies.  These three publicly traded companies, InterDig-
ital, Tessera, and Rambus, are similar in a key aspect: they all at-
tempted to compete in the marketplace as operating companies
before turning to aggressive enforcement of their patent portfolios.94
While people may debate whether these three companies should be
categorized as NPEs, there should be no debate that they are quite
distinct from speculators who purchase patents from others with the
intent to enforce. The patents that these three companies monetized
in the 2000s were largely “home grown,” developed by their own engi-
neers in the 1990s.95  As such, it is not surprising that these three com-
panies have not paid large sums of monies to individual inventors to
purchase patent rights.  These companies paid the inventors of their
patents with wages, stock options, benefits, etc., during the course of
93 See id. at 410 tbl.5.
94 See InterDigital Commc’ns Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 13 (Apr. 1, 1996)
(showing that InterDigital employed 96 employees in Research and Development and only
2 employees in Patent Licensing); Rambus Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 5 (Dec. 15,
1997) (showing that Rambus employed 99 employees in R&D and 27 in Marketing); Tes-
sera Techs. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 13 (Mar. 8, 2004) (showing that Tessera
employed 53 engineers in R&D and only 16 employees in Sales & Marketing).
95 See, e.g., InterDigital Commc’ns Corp., Amended Annual Report (Form 10-K/A) at
11 (Jan. 28, 2004) (describing InterDigital’s patent-licensing activities in the 2000s).
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their employment.96  These costs do not appear on their 10-Ks from
the 2000s, however, as they were accrued years earlier.  Thus, we do
not believe that Bessen and Meurer’s data on publicly traded NPEs
shows that the average NPE only returns 7% to individual inventors.
Instead, we believe it tells us something much less interesting, and
something very specific to the histories of these companies.
Separately, we question whether comparing licensing revenues to
R&D expenditures in the same year is appropriate.  It takes many
years for research to translate into inventions and patents.  Research
takes time, the patenting process takes time, and markets take time to
develop.  Consequently, we should expect to see a lag of many years
between investment in R&D and extraction of value from the patents
resulting from the R&D.  For instance, for many years in the 1990s,
Rambus’s R&D expenditures exceeded the licensing revenues that
they generated.97  In the 2000s, these values reversed: the licensing
revenues exceeded the R&D expenditures.98  We believe that this is
consistent with the lag in the patenting process.  These companies in-
vested heavily in R&D in the 1990s and exploited their patents in the
2000s.  By comparing R&D expenditures only during the time period
of enforcement, Bessen and Meurer’s analysis only shows half of the
picture.
Finally, we believe that payments by NPEs to the original patent
holder should be compared to a baseline.  Why is one-quarter too
low?  Without these payments, the inventors may receive zero com-
pensation for their patents.  NPEs may provide an avenue for those
outside the marketplace, such as universities and individual inventors,
to obtain payouts for valid and infringed patents.  Those payouts theo-
retically incentivize others to innovate.
By creating options to generate rewards for innovators otherwise
shut out of the marketplace, even publicly traded NPEs may play a
valuable role.  Together with contingency-fee lawyers whose business
models depend on choosing the right patents and the right patentees,
NPEs can create important avenues for appropriating rewards for val-
uable patent rights that are owned by non–market players.  Even if
other entities use their patented technologies, they may lack the re-
sources to enforce their patent rights by hiring traditional patent at-
96 See Interdigital Commc’ns Corp., supra note 94, at 48 (describing compensation R
packages for employees); Rambus Inc., supra note 94, at 33 (same); Tessera Techs. Inc., R
supra note 94, at 48, 54 (same). R
97 See, e.g., Rambus Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 27 (Dec. 12, 1998) (showing
multiple years of financial data in which Rambus expended more on R&D than it earned
in licensing).
98 See Rambus Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 46 (Feb. 21, 2006) (showing that
Rambus earned more in licensing fees than it expended in R&D); Tessera Techns., Inc.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 31 (Mar. 16, 2006) (same for Tessera).
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torneys who engage in hourly billing practices.  The risk and
uncertainty associated with representing patentees that do not have
the ability to pay traditional hourly billing rates is prohibitive, and
hence, most such patentees are shut out of the typical enforcement
mechanisms that are available to large companies.  Taking on the bur-
den of enforcing patents through a contingency-fee representation is
an option that is available primarily for a select group of innovators
with patent rights that are perceived as valuable before litigation
commences.99
Ultimately, such an approach favors those who are capable of
producing patented products or services and punishes those who can-
not take their patented technologies to market without addressing the
real legal question in all patent disputes—is there a valid patent claim
that is infringed?  In short, instead of focusing on the merits of the
patent claim, the nature of the parties is used as a proxy for judging
the merits of the patent claim—a fundamentally flawed and unfair
result that will significantly distort the supply of inventions.
B. Recommended Additional Disclosures About Methodology
Before mentioning our suggestions for further disclosure, first we
defend Bessen and Meurer from criticism that others have raised.
Some have argued that Bessen and Meurer’s results are “biased” be-
cause they received funding from a group, the Coalition for Patent
Fairness, with an interest in the direction of the results.100  These crit-
ics have also argued that the results are biased because RPX, the com-
pany who conducted the survey and provided other data, apparently
has a similar interest in the direction of the results.101  We believe that
this criticism misses the mark.  We do not believe that receiving fund-
ing or using industry data is automatically indicative of biased data.
Instead, we believe that when the appearance of potential bias is pre-
sent, it is incumbent on the researchers to show that their data is valid,
reliable, and transparent.102
We contend that Bessen and Meurer should provide more infor-
mation on the issues of validity, reliability, and transparency.  As is,
99 See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 356. R
100 See, e.g., Jerry Crimmins, Intellectual Property Attorneys Quarrel with ‘Patent Troll’ Study,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (July 9, 2012) (explaining that some groups believe that financial assis-
tance makes the patent-troll study biased while others do not).
101 See id.
102 Transparency means fully disclosing the precise methods used in a study.  Reliabil-
ity refers to whether the measurements can be reproduced if generated by others.  Validity
refers to how accurate the measurements are. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of
Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 83, 85, 87 (2002). See generally ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER
K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 26 (2010)
(“[S]teps . . . taken in your research must be transparent and obvious enough so that
another researcher can duplicate what you have done . . . .”).
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Bessen and Meurer’s study does not provide us enough information to
evaluate the quality of the data and methods.  Because Bessen and
Meurer note that even they themselves do not have access to some
and perhaps all of the underlying data,103 the validity and reliability of
RPX’s data are critical.104  This includes both the litigation-cost survey
and the general NPE database.  With respect to surveys, the norm in
academic articles is to provide copies of the exact survey language and
describe in detail any promotional materials.105  This practice permits
other researchers to verify that necessary and appropriate precautions
were taken to avoid bias.  Bessen and Meurer’s study does not provide
sufficient information, and the missing information could be critical.
For instance, we understand that the documentation informed poten-
tial subjects that the results of the study would be used to lobby for
changes in the patent laws.106  Such an instruction could be read as
encouraging exaggeration.  It could also affect the response rate and
increase the bias in the sample, with those more interested in patent
reform (i.e., those with larger patent exposure) being more likely to
complete the survey.  Inclusion of this sort of statement in the docu-
mentation would cause survey experts to seriously discount the results.
With respect to RPX’s NPE database, the study reports that RPX classi-
fies which patent holders are NPEs.  Because there is some discretion
in these classifications, we recommend providing some measure of re-
liability of coding.107
Our Essay should not be understood to say that we know that the
databases are unreliable or lack validity.  It merely submits that we
have insufficient information to evaluate.  Bessen and Meurer defend
their data by stating: “[i]n the two years since we first published our
event study, no one has come forward with actual empirical evidence
to suggest our estimates are substantially biased.”108  While their state-
103 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 398 n.55.  (“To preserve data confidentiality, R
statistical analysis was performed by RPX personnel working under our direction.”).  Per-
haps confidentiality obligations change the dynamic, but we note that this arrangement—
legal academics authoring a study without even having access to the underlying data—is
highly unconventional.
104 See Lee Epstein & Charles E. Clarke, Jr., Academic Integrity and Legal Scholarship in the
Wake of Exxon Shipping, Footnote 17, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 43 (2010) (noting that it
is appropriate to treat funded research with skepticism and that validity, reliability, and
transparency are the keys to accessing such scholarship).
105 See, e.g., Epstein & King, supra note 102, at 46 (noting the convention on reporting R
responses to surveys).
106 RPX, NPE Cost Study: Invitation to Participate, at 10 (Jan. 2012) (on file with
authors).
107 Reliability is typically reported by using measures such as Cohen’s Kappa. See  Mark
A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV.
63, 113–14 (2008) (stating that the best practice for relaying reliability information is to
report a coefficient such as Cohen’s Kappa).
108 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 416. R
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ment has some truth, we believe that the burden of persuasion should
fall on the researcher, especially when proprietary data is being relied
upon.  Given that the survey data contains third parties’ confidential
information, we recognize the difficulty in full disclosure.  However,
these shortcomings limit the data’s usefulness.
Before concluding our discussion of Bessen and Meurer’s study,
we want to respond briefly to one other item in their “Response to
Critics” section.109  Bessen and Meurer argue that “we already know
that the aggregate value of patent-based incentives is smaller than the
aggregate value of negative incentives in the sectors affected by NPE
litigation.”110  They base this assertion—that patents provide a tax on
innovation—on an event study that they previously conducted.111
Their event study investigated movements in stock prices around an
event, namely, the filing of patent lawsuits.
While responding to this previous study is beyond the scope of
this Essay, we offer two observations.  First, others have harshly criti-
cized this methodology.112  It is limited to litigation involving publicly
traded companies, which comprise a minority of parties in patent liti-
gation.  It focuses only around the filing dates of lawsuits, not the issue
date of patents or the resolution dates of lawsuits.113  Further, many of
the losses purportedly identified after the filing of a lawsuit are paper
losses; the market may cause the stock to drop somewhat irrationally
since there is some risk posed by the lawsuit.  As more information
becomes available, the stock may bounce back.114  The model com-
pletely ignores such a bounce back.
Second, even a cursory review of the results of the event study
cause us to have great concern about the validity of the findings.  That
study reports that, using their event-study methodology, they calcu-
lated that each NPE lawsuit caused each defendant a drop in market
capitalization between $122 million and $140.6 million at the mean,
109 Id. at 412–22.
110 Id. at 418.
111 See Bessen et al., supra note 4, at 26. R
112 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., On the Continuing Misuse of Event Studies: The Example of
Bessen and Meurer, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 35, 37, 49–56 (2008) (arguing that academics
cannot trust Bessen and Meurer’s argument that the patent system has discouraged innova-
tion).  For a thoughtful blog post on the limits of event studies, see Lisa Larrimore Ouel-
lette, Patent Costs & Benefits, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (July 2, 2013), http://writtendescription
.blogspot.com/2013/07/costs-benefits.html (arguing that when reading event studies,
readers should keep in mind exactly what authors are estimating and stating that it may be
valuable to have a more thorough discussion about authors’ results on the merits).
113 For an interesting paper that finds that correlations between patent-holder trial-
court victories and stock increases, see Alan C. Marco & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Certain
Patents, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2324538.
114 Ron D. Katznelson, Questionable Science Will Misguide Patent Policy, (Oct. 27,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://j.mp/Junk-Science.
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and between $20.4 million and $23.6 million at the median.115  Both
of us have substantial practice experience in patent litigation in vari-
ous capacities, and one of us has interviewed over fifty lawyers in-
volved in patent contingent practice.116  Based on our experiences,
such huge losses are facially implausible in our opinion, and they
cause us to question the applicability of the methodology to NPE liti-
gation.117  More importantly, with all due respect to Bessen and
Meurer, we are not persuaded that the event study alone supports
such a broad and sweeping claim that the patent system is completely
failing.
II
SUGGESTIONS FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NPES
Despite the difficulties, we believe that the role of NPEs in the
patent system can be studied empirically.  Toward that end, below we
offer some suggestions on how to properly analyze NPEs in litigation.
First, we believe that it is important to tease out differences, if
any, between NPE patent litigation and general patent or civil litiga-
tion.  Clearly, the litigation system in the United States is expensive.
The discovery process in all civil litigation is laborious and costly, and
patent litigation is some of the most expensive of all civil litigation.118
Thus, we must take pains to ensure that we do not blame NPE patent
litigation for issues that are present in all patent litigation or complex
civil litigation.  Similarly, we need to guard against mixing the effects
of patents in general and NPE patents.  Many have complained that
patent scope sometimes lacks clarity and that the Patent Office has
granted weak or invalid patents.119  To tease out the specific effects of
NPE patent litigation, we need a baseline to which to compare.
Second, we believe it is important to evaluate the distribution of
lawsuits when studying a large and complicated system like NPE litiga-
tion.  By that, we mean that we should evaluate all (or a random sam-
ple of) NPE lawsuits.  In all litigation, there must be some clearly
frivolous cases, some clearly meritorious cases, and cases in between.
115 Bessen et al., supra note 4, at 30 tbl.3, 32 tbl.5. R
116 See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 357. R
117 Bessen and Meurer dismiss our complaints, characterizing them as merely our per-
sonal views as patent lawyers.  Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 413–14.  We disagree, as R
our views are informed by the contingent of lawyers who represent the patentees in many
of the cases.  Moreover, in our view, when one method of analyzing data provides results
that seem inconsistent with common sense, researchers should be cautious in making
broad inferences from those results.
118 See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 360 n.138. R
119 See generally id. at 370–71 (discussing how lawyers feel that patent lawsuits are weak,
ridiculous, and lead to the stretching of the patent); Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Igno-
rance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 (2001) (discussing how the Patent
Office has come under fire for not thoroughly examining patents).
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Patent litigation and NPE patent litigation must also have these types
of cases.  To us, what is critical is how many there are of each type of
case.  If 1% of NPE patent cases are clearly frivolous, that may still be
too much.  But we note that the problem and solution would be quite
different if 1% are clearly frivolous than if 50% are clearly frivolous.
Again, the distribution of cases is critical.
There are limits to looking merely at the number of cases.  It
seems likely that the number of NPE lawsuits has risen in recent years.
However, that fact alone tells us very little.  There are many different
potential explanations, and they are not mutually exclusive.  It could
be that NPEs are asserting more nuisance lawsuits.  It could be that
the PTO issued some bad patents—vaguely worded, broad, and likely
invalid—in the mid- to late 1990s and we are seeing those enforced
only now; those patents may be concentrated in the e-commerce and
consumer-electronics fields.  It could be that patents held by NPEs are
being infringed more often.  The norms at some large manufacturers
in this space may differ from other industries, and patent clearance ex
ante may be utilized less.  Or it could be that NPEs, to the extent that
they are not the original owner, are buying patents that are already
infringed.  The change could be due to individual inventors or small
companies who had been excluded from enforcement due to the high
costs of litigation.  Whether because of contingent-fee lawyers, alterna-
tive litigation financing, or patentees’ ability to sell their patents, these
patents are now available for litigation.  More lawsuits may be a good
thing because it encourages people to respect patent rights.  The ben-
efits, if any, from the lawsuits need to be balanced against the costs.
But focusing merely on the number of lawsuits does not tell us which
of these stories is most true.
And before we conclude that widespread opportunistic conduct is
occurring, we need better data on the merits of NPE patent cases,
settlement amounts in those cases, the length of time NPE cases last,
and the amount of attorneys’ fees paid by defendants and NPEs to get
a true picture of what the reality is.  We also need better data to assess
a different common criticism: that certain types of NPEs—those who
are unrelated to the original inventors—pocket a large part of the
settlement amounts received and pass little on to the inventors who
initially developed the patented technology.  We need more data to
assess this, but what we currently know appears to point to the oppo-
site conclusion.  For instance, Acacia Research Group, perhaps the
largest publicly traded NPE, reported that in 2011, it paid more in
royalties to inventors than it did to the contingent-fee attorneys who
enforced their patents in litigation.120
120 Press Release, Acacia Research Corp., Acacia Research Reports First Quarter Finan-
cial Results (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.acaciaresearch.com/pr/042011.pdf.
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In sum, the empirical study of NPE patent litigation is at an early
stage.  Part of the reason is because NPE patent litigation has rapidly
grown in the very near past.  Empirical research takes time to be com-
pleted, and it requires sufficient past data to evaluate.  We look for-
ward to evaluating more research as it is released.
III
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
We believe that further empirical information, including that de-
scribed in the previous Part, would be useful to analyze the role of
NPEs in the patent system.  We note, however, that most of the press
and academic commentary recite Bessen and Meurer’s study and
other academic studies as if they are unimpeachable facts.  For in-
stance, an August 2012 report by the Congressional Research Service
largely adopts Bessen and Meurer’s results, without any critical analy-
sis.  In fact, the report, entitled “An Overview of the ‘Patent Trolls’ De-
bate,” actually overstates their results.121  The report states that “PAEs
[Patent Assertion Entities] generated $29 billion in revenues from de-
fendants and licensees in 2011.”122  Of course, Bessen and Meurer did
not make this claim.  They claimed that NPEs “cost” accused infring-
ers $29 billion,123 about a quarter of which comprised legal fees.124
The accused infringers’ legal fees are not revenue to patent holders.
The remainder of the report is notably deficient on solid empirical
evidence on key points.  For instance, the report mentions support for
the claim that the benefits of PAEs are “significantly outweighed by
the costs.”125  This claim’s validity hinges on a truly empirical ques-
tion.  The support for this broad claim includes a citation to another
report that involved Bessen and Meurer.126  Apparently, the Congres-
sional Research Service reissued its report in April 2013 to correct
these shortcomings.127  We submit that others should be cautious
before making such broad claims based on Bessen and Meurer’s study
and that more rigorous work is needed.  Bessen and Meurer’s study
was cited approvingly in the report Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation
121 See BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42668, AN OVERVIEW OF THE “PATENT
TROLLS” DEBATE, summary (2012), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R42668_
20120820.pdf.
122 Id. (emphasis added).
123 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 389. R
124 Id. at 400 n.62.
125 YEH, supra note 121, at 2. R
126 Id. at 2 n.13.
127 See BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42668, AN OVERVIEW OF THE “PATENT
TROLLS” DEBATE, summary, 2 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R426
68.pdf.
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by the Executive Office of the President, issued in June 2013.128  We
hope that the Executive Branch carefully considers the limitations of
the study, such as those presented in this Essay, in its consideration of
NPEs.
In sum, we believe that Bessen and Meurer have not provided
sufficient valid data to make a full diagnosis of the problem.  They
have not adequately studied the problem, and therefore we believe
that their conclusions are premature and perhaps even unfounded.
Currently, there is a lack of scientific evidence that widespread and
systematic problems exist with NPEs, and if they do, what the magni-
tude of the problems is.
One common criticism of NPEs (however that term is defined) is
that they initiate patent infringement lawsuits seeking to enforce pat-
ents of dubious quality or with questionable infringement claims and
then settle for amounts far less than the defendants’ litigation costs.129
The story is that NPEs take strategic advantage of the notoriously high
cost of patent litigation, which requires several million dollars in attor-
neys’ fees to litigate through the close of discovery.130
There is little firm empirical evidence supporting this scenario of
the combination of dubious patent assertions and low settlement de-
mands.  There is some evidence that NPEs settle more quickly com-
pared to other patent holders, which could indicate the possibility of
nuisance settlements.131  Better data on this point is needed.  But
there is also empirical evidence that the patents asserted by NPEs are
similar to patents asserted by practicing entities.132  There is some evi-
dence that the most litigious NPEs lose more often when the cases are
taken to a final judgment;133 however, like other types of complex civil
litigation, the vast majority of patent cases settle before judgment.134
For a moment, let us assume that solid data confirms that NPEs in
general are a problem for the patent system.  Let us assume that wide-
128 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 9–10 &
n.5 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_re
port.pdf.
129 See, e.g., Lu, supra note 13, at 56, 58 (describing the work of Bronwyn H. Hall & R
Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, An Empirical Analysis of Patent Litigation in the Semiconductor
Industry (Jan. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), and emphasizing the use of “patents of
dubious merit” as well as the study by Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An
Economic Model and Proposal, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159 (2008),
analyzing the offer of settlements that are much lower than litigation costs (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
130 See, e.g., Risch, supra note 2, at 467 (noting legal fees of $500,000 through the sum- R
mary judgment stage up to legal fees of $4 million or more through trial).
131 See Lu, supra note 13, at 58. R
132 See Risch, supra note 2, at 458 (“[T]he patents enforced by so-called trolls—and the R
companies that obtained them—look a lot like other litigated patents and their owners.”).
133 See Allison et al., supra note 41, at 687 tbl.3. R
134 Kesan & Ball, supra note 41, at 271–72 & n.212. R
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spread opportunistic behavior is occurring.  If so, we believe that the
antidote is finding ways to lower transaction costs in the patent system.
In other words, the fact that the patent-litigation system is so expen-
sive provides a potential for mischief.  Lowering the costs of patent
litigation would significantly reduce any actual mischief.  There are
numerous ways to lower transaction costs.  Even if one were to make
the extreme assumption that all NPE lawsuits are meritless, then what
are needed are low-cost mechanisms to challenge the validity of as-
serted patents.  In an ideal world, disputes would be resolved
costlessly.  Invalid patents could easily be wiped away.  Infringers
could be forced to pay adequate compensation instantaneously.  How-
ever, the civil-litigation system in the United States is expensive, and
patent litigation is extremely expensive.  Because patent litigation is so
expensive, there is the potential for mischief.  Patent holders or ac-
cused infringers may assert weak claims or defenses knowing that the
high cost of litigation shields these actions from scrutiny.
The new inter partes review (IPR) and post grant review (PGR)
proceedings authorized by the America Invents Act135 may present op-
portunities for low-cost patent invalidation.  The final rules were set in
late 2012, and thus we do not yet know whether this will reduce the
wasteful transaction costs in challenging low-quality patents.  Perhaps,
as some have contended, the estoppel provision governing both IPR
and PGR may prove to be too heavy a burden for challengers to bear,
but perhaps not.136  Nevertheless, it is critical that we develop low-cost
and effective mechanisms to challenge patents.  To do so, we need to
evaluate these new procedures as they are utilized in practice to en-
sure that they are adequate for their intended purpose.  We must be
mindful of whether the estoppel provision in the statutes inordinately
deters pursuing potential challenges.  At the same time, we must also
be appreciative that without an adequate estoppel or other provision,
patentees may be subject to repeated filings of patent challenges, with
the consequent delays.  With some additional reform to the IPR stat-
ute, if necessary, we remain confident that the goal of creating a rela-
tively cheap, relatively swift, and accurate (as determined by
affirmance by the Federal Circuit on appeal) patent-challenge regime
can be realized.
Other than these administrative mechanisms to invalidate pat-
ents, perhaps a small-claims court could be created for patents below a
threshold value to cheaply and quickly resolve patent infringement
135 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
136 We recognize that the estoppel issue is complicated because of a concern that small
patent holders may be harassed by serial oppositions.
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claims.137  A task force of the American Bar Association’s IP Section is
currently investigating this option, and the U.S. Patent Office formally
requested comments on such a proposal.138  A small-claims court
could reduce the cost of adjudicating patent assertions with modest
damages claims.  In turn, this would hopefully tie settlement values
more closely to the merits of the underlying disputes and remove
them farther from the costs of litigation.
Perhaps early-stage ADR may be effective, or curtailing substantial
discovery until after Markman hearings.  Alternatively, the district
court judges can use their inherent power to manage litigation to re-
duce costs.  Guidance could be provided to judges to aid in identify-
ing cases in which the stakes are likely small or the merits of the
patentee’s case initially appear weak.  In these cases, the district court
judges can curtail discovery to make the cost of litigation commensu-
rate with the risks and stakes of the case.  In other words, if the real
policy concern is high transaction costs, then we need alternative,
low-cost mechanisms to invalidate patents or to prove
noninfringement.
Marketplace solutions for reducing transaction costs are also pos-
sible.  These include reducing the legal fees to accused infringers on
lower-value cases by alternative fee arrangements (i.e., capped fees per
phase of the case), engagement of less expensive counsel, and per-
haps RPX’s defensive-acquisition model.  Alternatively, pro bono ser-
vices, such as those currently being considered by the Application
Developers Alliance, may be a positive development for small accused
infringers in cases containing indicia of nuisance-style patent
assertions.
We note that our proposal is the opposite of what Congress is
currently considering in the Saving High-tech Innovators from Egre-
gious Legal Disputes, or “SHIELD,” Act.139  In that proposed bill, Con-
gress is considering one-way fee shifting against patent owners in
patent cases.140  Instead of lowering the costs of patent litigation, this
raises the costs, although only for one party.  We believe that lowering
the costs is a preferred solution.
Under the proposed bill, fees must be paid to the accused in-
fringer if the patent owner does not prevail, even without any allega-
tion or proof of baseless or frivolous litigation or some litigation
137 See Robert P. Greenspoon, Is the United States Finally Ready for a Patent Small Claims
Court?, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 549, 551 (2009).
138 Request for Comments on a Patent Small Claims Proceeding in the United States,
77 Fed. Reg. 74,830 (Dec. 18, 2012).
139 Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 845,
113th Cong. (2013).
140 See id. § 2(a).
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misconduct.141  In other words, losing a case is the basis for fee shift-
ing.  Perhaps more important is that patentees in these cases would be
required to post a bond to cover the cost of the potential fee shifting
in order to assert their underlying claims of infringement.142  Thus,
the SHIELD Act would increase the costs of enforcing patents.
The SHIELD Act apparently is intended to cover only patent
trolls.143  The Act excludes from its reach practicing entities, individ-
ual inventors, and universities.144  However, the definitions used in
the Act to cover only “trolls” are too broad and sweep in many others.
For instance, if a company assigns its patent to its own subsidiary hold-
ing company that does not make a product, then it likely will be sub-
ject to the automatic fee-shifting and bond provisions.  Second, the
fee-shifting and bond provisions appear to apply to an inventor who
assigns his patents to a company that he has formed for legitimate
business reasons and that he entirely owns and controls.
In sum, if passed in its current form, the proposed bill will have
the effect of undermining the value of all patents and significantly
impacting the U.S. innovation economy and ecosystem.  Because pure
NPEs will face fee shifting in litigation, patents they acquire will be less
valuable than the same patents owned by others.  Many NPEs will be
unable to afford the cost of the bond to pursue litigation and will
instead be forced to stay out of the market.  Without these potential
purchases, individual inventors and failed start-ups will find it more
difficult to dispose of their patents.  With fewer parties willing to
purchase their patents, the patents will have lower values.
Furthermore, the SHIELD Act will likely have a variety of unin-
tended consequences.  For one, the Act will encourage individual in-
ventors to utilize alternative litigation financing rather than selling
their patent to a pure non-practicing entity.  Alternative litigation-fi-
nancing companies, in exchange for a percentage of the litigation re-
coveries, provide loans to patent holders to enable engagement of
hourly fee billing lawyers.145  Because an individual inventor enforc-
ing her own patent will not be subject to the fee shifting provisions of
the SHIELD Act while pure non-practicing entities will, we suspect
that the Act will encourage more alternative litigation financing.
141 See id.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 373 (citing Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, R
2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 801–02 (2010)); see also STEVEN GARBER, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUS-
TICE, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND
UNKNOWNS 37 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occa
sional_papers/2010/RAND_OP306.pdf (“[Alternative litigation financing] can be a fairly
close substitute for selling the patent to an NPE.”).
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In general, we believe that focusing on whether the patent holder
is an NPE or practicing entity is the wrong question.  Our point is not
to extol or criticize NPEs.  We believe that the correct inquiry requires
a focus on the actions of the parties and not on the nature or identity
of the parties.  There surely are some NPEs that are bad actors and
some that are good actors.  Instead, our goal is to focus the conversa-
tion on the right questions, namely, what are the merits of the cases
and what are ways to reduce patent-litigation expenses by creating or
improving institutional mechanisms to address patent validity and pat-
ent infringement.  Our approach would help address a common argu-
ment: that NPEs are not true innovators but rather they wait for
another to expend resources to commercialize a product with the pat-
ented technology and then demand a “tax” on it.  We think that ex-
isting patent law doctrines can be used to analyze this criticism: Are
the asserted patent claims invalid as obvious?  Does the accused prod-
uct embody the asserted claims?  Is there some other defense to in-
fringement that has merit?  What is the appropriate amount of
damages for infringement?  And does equity support the entry of an
injunction?
CONCLUSION
In sum, as patent scholars, we strongly believe that data is critical
to the study of the patent system.  The patent system is too important
to evaluate without data.  Data can help us make informed policy
choices.  Bessen and Meurer’s study provides some new data for dis-
cussion.  However, limitations in the data suggest to us that their find-
ings should be viewed skeptically, as an outer boundary of the costs of
NPE litigation, and one that is likely to be substantially overstated.
With respect to the debate about NPEs, we believe that focusing
on costs and transfers from NPEs are somewhat beside the point.  The
bigger picture, and the better question, is whether the lawsuits are
being brought because the defendants are infringers of a valid patent
or whether the defendants are merely easy targets for a nuisance law-
suit.  That requires looking beyond the identity of the patentee.  It
means that we need to evaluate the patents being asserted to see if
there are credible patent claims that are valid, enforceable, and in-
fringed.  Making all NPEs a scapegoat for the costs associated with
patent enforcement will end up hurting inventors who are solely fo-
cused on creating valuable technologies without addressing the real
policy options for improving the patent system.
To the extent that changes to the patent system are needed, we
suggest focusing on reducing transaction costs (e.g., lawyers’ fees) in
patent litigation, offering cheaper mechanisms to challenge issued
patents (the AIA’s post-grant challenges and other administrative pro-
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cedures for challenging validity appear to be a step in the right direc-
tion), and providing cheaper and quicker adjudication through a new
small-claims court for patent lawsuits, instead of focusing solely on
whether the patent holder is a non-practicing entity.
To us, we should not focus on the identity of the patent holder;
instead, we should examine the actions of the patent holder and the
merits of their patent assertions.  The questions we should be asking
are: Are the claims likely invalid?  Is the allegation of infringement
untethered to the original invention?  And is the quantum of damages
sought based upon a sound damages theory?
